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When House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) was forced to vacate his 
leadership position following an indictment in 2005, California Representative David 
Dreier was a leading candidate to fill the opening DeLay left.  However, Dreier was not 
selected for the job after a group of conservative Republicans questioned his commitment 
to the conservative agenda.  One of the reasons for doubt cited by these lawmakers was 
Dreier’s vote in favor of federal funding for embryonic stem cell research.1  Prior to 
2005, Dreier had consistently voted in favor of legislation banning federal funding of 
embryonic stem cell research.  However, following a referendum in which the 
congressman’s district approved a measure allowing and providing funding for 
embryonic stem cell research in the state of California, he supported federal funding for 
the research nationwide.  This paper seeks to answer the following question: Why did 
David Dreier, along with several of his colleagues from California, change his voting 
pattern? 
In order to find the answer to this question, this study will examine contentious 
issues in the American political realm, as well as the impact of the particular issue of 
stem cell research on legislative behavior.  This study seeks to explore the hypothesis that 
legislators align their positions on wedge issues with the preferences of their districts in 
order to gain reelection.  Specifically, it examines representation in order to determine 
whether the representational affiliation of a member of Congress, such as delegate or 
trustee, is shifted due to district opinions on wedge issue.    In order to test the hypothesis, 
a review of the literature has been conducted, first to determine current trends in 
representation, second to clearly define the term “wedge issue,” and finally to examine 
                                                 
1 Shesgreen, Dierdre. “DeLay’s Legal Trouble Helps to Consolidate Rep. Blunt’s Power.” The St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch. 29 September 2005. pg A9. 
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patterns in Congressional roll-call voting.  Data will be gathered from the 2004 California 
statewide election regarding stem cell research in order to determine district opinion.  The 
behavior of representatives will then be analyzed to determine whether stances changed 
in accordance with the popular opinion of representatives’ districts.   
If, as Mayhew states in Congress:  the Electoral Connection, the main goal of a 
legislator is to win reelection, then there may be certain situations in which that 
representative must appeal to the majority of voters in his district.  When an issue is at 
hand that is widely known throughout the district, which voters view as important, and 
about which the constituency holds strong opinions, it may be in the best interest of the 
representative’s reelection campaign to align his vote in the legislature with the 
preferences of the majority of his constituents.  In such a situation, the issue may be a 
wedge issue, and we might say that the representative is acting in the representational role 
of a delegate.  However, before determining whether wedge issues generally cause a 
legislator to act as a delegate, literature must be reviewed to discover the meaning of 
representation, the stability of political roles, and in which situations certain legislators 
will take on different roles. 
Representation is the chief component of this study, and in order to fully 
understand the concept of representation, it is important to discuss historic views of the 
subject, as well as more modern approaches.  Thomas Hobbes was a seventeenth century 
philosopher and is best known for his political work Leviathan, published in 1651.  
Hobbes defined representation in terms of “author” and “actor”—an “author” was a 
person who performed words and actions, and an “actor” was a person to whom an author 
gave authority to perform words and actions on his behalf.  Representation, or as Hobbes 
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called it, personation occurred when the multitude of men gave up their right of 
governing themselves to an assembly or king.  In Hobbes’ opinion, there was to be one 
“actor” to represent a nation, and that person was to be a sovereign monarch.  Hobbes felt 
that a monarch could create a unified nation out of a multitude of men because, in theory, 
the monarch acted on behalf of all people.2  Today in the United States, political 
representation is generally not imagined in terms of a sovereign monarch who is 
responsible for the needs of all persons in a nation.  Instead, representation is viewed to 
be a representative who stands in place of the people in a certain geographic area, who is 
concerned with local desires and who represents those desires to the nation. 
Another view which has had a great deal of influence on modern views of 
representation is the one presented by Edmund Burke.  Burke was an 18th century British 
philosopher and Member of Parliament and is well known for his works concerning the 
American and French Revolutions.3  Though he never systematically characterized his 
philosophy on representation or dedicated an entire publication to the subject, he made 
his position clear in his speeches, letters, and writings concerning the English 
constitutional system.4  Burke believed that the government of a nation ought to be 
comprised of the most elite citizens of the nation.  He stated that the people, especially 
the poor, did not know what was in their own best interest; therefore, they could not 
know what was in the best interest of a nation.  He spoke of the ridiculousness of 
listening to the opinions of the poor:5 
                                                 
2 Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Richard Tuck. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991. 
3 Fasel, George W. (1983). Edmund Burke. Boston: Twayne Publishers.  
4 Burke, Edmund. “The English Constitutional System.” Representation. Ed. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin.  New 
York: Atherton Press, 1969. 
5 Ibid, 172. 
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The most poor, illiterate, and uninformed creatures upon earth are judges of a 
practical oppression.  It is a matter of feeling; and as such persons generally have 
felt most of it, and are not of an over-lively sensibility, they are the best judges of 
it.  But for the real cause, or the appropriate remedy, they ought never to be 
called into council about one or the other.  They ought to be totally shut out; 
because their reason is weak; because, when they are roused, their passions are 
ungoverned; because the smallness of the property which individually they 
possess renders them less attentive to the consequence of the measures they adopt. 
 
Burke believed that a “natural aristocracy” should govern—that only those men who 
were reared in a place of estimation, who were educated, and who served in such 
positions as army commanders, professors of science and liberal arts, or lawyers, were fit 
to lead a nation.6 
Burke’s ideas about representation were probably very common during his time—
he was clearly not an advocate of the American ideal of “all men are created equal,” but it 
is questionable whether powerful Americans embraced equality.  If one compares 
Burke’s philosophy with the political scene in America following the Revolution, it is 
probably clear that he and the Founding Fathers did not disagree.  The Constitutional 
Convention was made up of only the most educated American men; the first President 
was a brilliant military commander; the Constitution was specifically designed to reserve 
the most powerful legislative assembly, the Senate, for elites; and in many states, poor 
men—those who did not own land—were not even granted the right to vote.  It was not 
until 1820 that a “common” man, Andrew Jackson, was elected president; and in many 
cases states did not abolish property ownership as a qualification to vote until the 1830s, 
and it was 1917 before Senators were elected directly by the American people. 
Burke’s work describes perhaps the dominant political philosophy of elites during 
his time, but it is also important because it outlines the representational role of a trustee.  
                                                 
6 Burke, Edmund. “The English Constitutional System.” Representation. Ed. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin.  New 
York: Atherton Press, 1969. 
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He believed it was the duty of a legislator to consider the opinions of his constituency, 
and then act according to national best interest.  He stated in a letter to his constituents, 
“Your representative owes you not only his industry, but his judgment; and he betrays, 
instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”7  Today, scholars define a 
trustee as a representative who, if he had “evidence of overwhelming constituent 
preference on a policy position that conflicted wit his conscience, his inclination would 
be to vote with his conscience,”8 a position with which Burke would surely agree. 
Hanna Pitkin’s 1967 book The Concept of Representation is one of the most 
important and heavily cited works relating to representation to date.  Her reviews of 
Hobbes and Burke reveal changes that have taken place as societies have shifted from 
monarchical and elitist political theory towards modern day views of equality between 
representatives and those represented.  She defines representation as “the making present 
in some sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact.”9  In a 
political sense in the United States, representation might be defined as the making present 
of the opinions of members of a geographical district by an elected official in the 
legislature. 
The most important framework laid out in the book is Pitkin’s theory of four types 
of representation.  First, formal representation is concerned with the rules and institutions 
that allow representation to take place, such as fair and frequent elections.  Symbolic 
representation occurs when constituents perceive that their representative is effectively 
acting on their behalf in the legislature, whether they truly are or not.  Chiefly, the 
                                                 
7 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel (Ed.) 1969.  Representation.  New York: Atherton Press. 175. 
8 Price, Ken D. 1985. “Instability in Representational Role Orientation in a State Legislator:  A Research 
Note.” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 38, No.1 (March 1985), 162-171. 
9 Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel 1967. The Concept of Representation. Los Angeles:  University of California 
Press. 
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symbol, or representative is the recipient of feelings, and he must augment the good 
feelings of his constituency about him.  Descriptive representation refers to the legislature 
reflecting the demographic makeup of the population.  This type of representation is 
based on the theory that people are best represented by those who look like them or share 
something in common with them—black interests are best represented by black people, 
for example.  Finally, substantive representation is said to occur when the policy 
preferences expressed by a representative through actions parallel the policy preferences 
of his or her constituency.  Pitkin suggests that substantive representation is an effect of a 
representative responding directly to the wishes of his constituency, but does not reason 
that such responsiveness is the only way to achieve a substantive relationship.  
Substantive is the most important form of representation for my research, because it is an 
attempt to measure congruency between the actions of representatives and the 
preferences of their districts. 
In order to best represent their district, some scholars suggest that representatives 
take on certain roles in order to make decisions about issues in the legislature.  
Representational role theory is the dominant theory for classifying representational 
orientations of legislators.  Burke first developed this theory, and believed that a 
representative either responded to the will of his constituents, or did what he thought was 
best.  Today, role theory has evolved beyond Burke’s either-or situation to include three 
types of orientations:  delegate, trustee, and politico.10  A delegate is considered to be a 
representative who will consistently vote the preferences of his constituency, even if they 
run contrary to his own.  A trustee, as outlined in the discussion of Burke, votes his own 
                                                 
10 Price, Ken D. 1985. “Instability in Representational Role Orientation in a State Legislator:  A Research 
Note.” The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 38, No.1 (March 1985), 162-171. 
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convictions with little regard to district opinion, believing that constituents would 
understand his choice if they were fully informed.  A politico is a combination of 
delegate and trustee, and will usually claim to take one role or the other depending on the 
issue at hand.  For example, a politico will act as a delegate when his constituency has a 
great deal of knowledge about the issue, or if that issue will affect the district.  However, 
when the issue is complicated or unimportant to the district, the representative will act as 
a trustee.  
Donald J. McCrone and James H. Kuklinski examined representational role 
theory and sought to test the role of delegate, which the authors believe hinges on two 
fundamental conditions.  First, a representative must believe that she is a delegate—she 
must take on that role, considering herself subservient to the will of her constituency.  
Second, the district must provide “consistent cues” to the legislator so that she may 
develop a correct sense of and accurately reflect her district’s opinion in her legislative 
behavior. 
McCrone and Kuklinski measured district opinion concerning “contemporary 
liberalism” issues in the California state legislature during the mid 1970s—issues such as 
elimination of masculine references in the California state Constitution, the establishment 
of low-income public housing requirements, and the creation of environmental 
reserves—and then measured legislators’ perceptions of those opinions.  The study 
concluded that representatives who consider themselves delegates are more likely to 
interpret district opinion accurately than non-delegates. 
This study is important because it concludes that the delegate theory of 
representation can predict the behavior of representatives.  However, there are very 
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strong conditions attached to the theory, both of which must be present in order for it to 
work.  I question the first condition—that a legislator must believe he is a delegate in 
order to act as a delegate.  Is it possible that a legislator need not be attached to a certain 
role?  Politicos constantly choose which role to play—that of delegate of their 
constituents’ wishes, or trustee of the local and national interest.  If politicos choose to 
act sometimes as trustees and other times as delegates, are they really attaching 
themselves to a certain role?  Furthermore, a legislator may only desire reelection and 
aim to please constituents on issues with which they are familiar.  The study approaches 
issues that were well known throughout the United States during the time period from 
which the data was gathered.  This type of issue is more likely to yield delegate-like 
behavior because of the potential repercussions a member of Congress would face if he 
did not please his constituents.  In other words, the goals of a member of Congress may 
affect his representation, an issue which is not addressed in this particular study. 
I agree with the second condition, that accurate cues must be provided to the 
representative in order for that representative to accurately reflect district opinion; 
however, it is possible that it is not the sole responsibility of the constituency to provide 
the legislator with their preferences.  The legislator may utilize preferences determined 
by referendums, or some scholars may suggest that interest groups, which monitor and 
report public opinion, provide a means for the legislator to judge accurately his district’s 
policy preferences.  Especially concerning issues in which high electoral consequences 
are potentially involved, I would expect the legislator to be proactive in attempting to 
discern public opinion.  McCrone and Kuklinski do not address this type of situation, 
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though they assert that representation is an intricate interaction between representatives 
and those they represent. 
Ken C. Price challenged representational role theory in a 1985 study.  Scholars 
who believe that role theory was a valid means to predict and explain legislative behavior 
assumed that political roles were stable over time—once a representative chose that she 
would act as a delegate, she would always act as a delegate.  However, Price 
hypothesized that legislators had little attachment to or reason for using the delegate-
trustee-politico approach, and therefore their role orientation would be inconsistent over 
time. 
Price gathered data by interviewing 33 non-freshman members of the lower house 
of the California state legislature over a period of three year, asking them,  
If you had evidence of overwhelming constituent preference (for example, a vote 
of your constituents on a referendum) on a policy position that conflicted with 
your conscience, would your inclination be to vote (A) your constituents’ 
preference, (B) your conscience, or (C) depends on the issue. 
 
He found that from 1978-1980, over half of the participants changed their role orientation 
at least once—only 14 were consistent in their selection through all three interviews.  The 
trustee, or Burkean, role was the most inconsistent, with eleven of sixteen original 
trustees changing positions; delegates and politicos did not change as much, but they 
were far from stable. 
Price concluded his study with the suggestion that the delegate-trustee-politico 
theory of representation has little meaning for describing and especially predicting the 
actions of legislators.  Twenty years later, the roles are still being taught in political 
science courses, though the theory is not necessarily presented as a means to predict 
legislative behavior.  Delegate and trustee are now understood more as descriptors for 
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certain actions.  For the purposes of my study, I would like to predict situations in which 
a representative will take on the delegate role.  Price found that representational roles are 
not stable over a period of three years, and this suggests that members of Congress do not 
hold fast to a certain representational style—changes in situations can change their 
behavior.  
Price’s finding of instability in representational roles is important for this study 
because it implies that legislators are willing to change the way in which they represent 
their district, perhaps with the goal pleasing their district in order to win re-election in 
mind.  One tool that representatives can use to help make decisions, especially 
concerning re-election, is called the median voter model.  Elisabeth R. Gerber and Jeffery 
B. Lewis define the median voter model as the prediction “that the logic of spatial 
competition will force legislators to take positions that correspond to the preferences of 
the median voter in their district.”11    The median voter can be defined as the “middle of 
the road” voter that must be persuaded to vote one way or another.  In other words, if a 
candidate wins an election by gaining 50 + 1 percent of the vote, the median voter is the 1 
percent that pushes him or her to victory.12  It does not matter if the candidate does not 
appeal to the other 49 percent of his district due to the winner-take-all election system in 
the United States.  Gerber and Lewis hypothesize that legislators from homogeneous 
districts are most constrained by the preferences of the median voter. 
Gerber and Lewis published a study in 2004 in which they analyzed a set of 
individual level voting data, considering the relationship between the preferences of the 
                                                 
11 Gerber, Elisabeth R. and Jeffery B. Lewis. (2004). “Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District 
Homogeneity and Political Representation.” Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, no. 6. 1364. 
12 Rice, Tom W. (1985). “An Examination of the Median Voter Hypothesis,” The Western Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1985), 211. 
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legislator’s district and the legislator’s behavior.  They hypothesize that representatives 
commonly deviate from the preferences of the median voter in their districts. 
The study attempts to examine three hypotheses concerning the median voter 
model in heterogeneous districts.  The possibilities include:  that heterogeneity is 
irrelevant and that legislators will converge to the median voter no matter what; that 
heterogeneity allows legislators more ability to diverge from the median; and finally that 
heterogeneity increases electoral competition and forces representatives to abide by the 
median voter.  Gerber and Lewis utilize data gathered from 2.8 million ballots cast for 13 
statewide measures and four partisan races in Los Angeles County, California to 
determine the preferences of the median voter for each of the county’s 55 legislative 
districts (24 California Assembly, 14 California Senate, and 17 U.S. House of 
Representatives).  They then employ role call votes, NOMINATE scores, and interest 
group ratings to assess the actions of the representative from each district relative to the 
preferences of the median voter in that district, or the quality of representation. 
Gerber and Lewis found a positive relationship between median voter preferences 
and legislative behavior—legislators in conservative districts have more conservative 
positions, while representatives from more liberal districts are likely to take more liberal 
action.  However, they also find that district composition plays an important role in the 
effect of the median voter—legislators from more heterogeneous districts seem to be less 
controlled by their district’s median preferences, whereas legislators from more 
homogenous districts seem more likely to be very in-tune with their median voter.  
Legislators are especially attentive to the median voter when many constituents share 
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these preferences.  One can infer from the article that representatives with homogenous 
districts are more likely to act as trustees. 
Gerber and Lewis’s study is important to this project because it offers situations 
in which representatives will act as delegates.  Furthermore, it raises questions about 
district composition concerning this study—is it possible for typically heterogeneous 
districts to have homogenous preferences concerning certain issues:  If that issue is of 
great salience to the district, might a legislator, fearing electoral punishment, attach more 
weight to that issue when taking action?  Is there likelihood of a more homogenous 
district opinion when a wedge issue is involved?  Will the representative then align his 
actions with the district’s median preference?  These are significant questions with 
significant implications for the wedge issue study. 
An important gap in much of the literature on representation concerns so-called 
exceptional cases.  To summarize Wahlke (1971), substantive representation is often not 
achieved due to a lack of coherent policy preferences among constituencies and poorly 
informed representatives except in exceptional cases.  McCrone and Kuklinski (1979), 
though they do not go into detail, argue that there is a difference in representation when 
issues are unusually salient.  Gerber and Lewis state that in exceptional cases, when 
policy preferences in a district are shared by many constituents, legislators are more 
likely to align themselves with district preferences.  “What are these exceptional cases?” 
may be the most important question raised by any of these authors.  Wedges issues may 
be the exception to the rule and a good fit to close the gap in research concerning 
representation.  
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Wedge issues are controversial and are often associated with morals or values – 
some issues may be so important to a voter that they may persuade him or her to vote for 
a candidate whose beliefs about the matter align with the voter's, regardless of party.13  At 
times, an issue will be so salient to an individual that it will create a wedge between that 
person and his or her "correct" party, or the party which would normally reflect that 
person's values. The term can also be related to Congress to signify issues that force 
representatives and senators to take a stand. Some of the most prominent “wedge issues” 
in the United States today are abortion, gay marriage, gun rights and stem cell research. 
Generally, most people have formed some sort of opinion on these issues. 
Wedge issues are generally also what political scientists refer to as "easy" issues. 
In other words, they elicit a "gut" reaction in a voter and not a "conscious calculation of 
policy benefits for alternative electoral choices.”14  Carmines and Stimson describe the 
characteristics of "easy" issues as 1) being symbolic in nature, 2) dealing with policy 
ends rather than means, and 3) being on the political agenda for a long period of time.15  
A voter needs little information or political knowledge to determine the positions of 
parties and candidates on these issues. An unsophisticated voter with a particularly strong 
opinion about such an issue might easily turn that attitude into a "single easy-issue" vote 
choice. 
From this discussion, wedge issues can be determined using a five-question test. 
First, is there a great deal of public awareness about the issue? Second, is the issue 
divisive, especially along moral or ethical cleavages? Third, is there some sort of 
                                                 
13 Davidson, Robert H. and Walter J. Oleszek (2004). Congress and its Members. Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press. 
14 Carmines, Edward C. and James A. Stimson (1980). “The Two Faces of Issue Voting.” The American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 74 (March, 1980): 78-91. 
15 Ibid. 
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emotional symbolism attached to the issue? Fourth, do politicians focus mainly on policy 
results, and ignore policy means? And finally, has the issue established itself on the 
political agenda for a sustained period of time?16  Assuming that all wedge issues fit this 
same basic definition, it can be concluded that each wedge issue will cause the same 
basic reaction in Congress, which will be discussed later. 
By definition, wedge issues are divisive, and it is important to note the passion 
they tend to bring out from both ends of the spectrum. Right-to-Choose activists and 
Right-to-Life groups, hoping to be noticed by lawmakers, often sponsor (separate) 
marches in Washington, D.C. to publicize their opposing positions on abortion. A Right-
to-Choose event can rarely take place without protest from the other extreme and vice-
versa; the demonstrators feel so strongly that sometimes fights break out and people are 
arrested. Furthermore, some anti-abortion advocates have taken their desire to save 
unborn human lives to the ultimate extreme, bombing abortion clinics and murdering 
abortion doctors. 
To further study the disputes wedge issues cause, take, for example, the 2004 
presidential election. The candidates, George W. Bush and John Kerry dedicated months 
to the campaign trail, taking strong yet very opposite positions on several ethical issues. 
Kerry, the Democrat, was more liberal on issues such as stem cell research and abortion, 
stressing the importance of medical advancements as well as a woman's right to choose. 
Bush on the other hand, a conservative Republican, emphasized the importance of a 
culture of life, advocating that both embryonic stem cell research and abortion terminate 
potential life, and should therefore be limited. 
                                                 
16 Conover, Pamela Johnston, Virginia Gray and Steven Coombs (1982). “Single Issue Voting:  Elite-Mass 
Linkages.” Political Behavior (Vol. 4): 309-331. 
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Wedge issues also elicit fervor when they are placed on ballots. In November 
2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional to prohibit same-
sex couples from marrying, and a further ruling in February 2004 stated that civil unions 
are an unacceptable alternative in instances when those couples are not allowed to marry. 
The following May, Massachusetts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
Several states responded to the Massachusetts decision with ballot initiatives that would 
amend their state constitutions to define marriage as a union between one woman and one 
man; several of those states went even further to prohibit anything that resembles 
marriage, such as civil unions, from being administered to gay couples. During the 
November 2004 election, eleven states voted on gay marriage amendments. 
The campaigns for and against these amendments were waged by many state-
specific organizations. Gay rights activists came out strongly opposed to the initiatives, 
while many religious organizations backed the amendments. In Ohio, for example, the 
Ohio Catholic Conference took a strong stand supporting the measure. Executive director 
of the organization, Timothy Lackhaupt, summed up the OCC's position: "We believe 
that marriage is between a man and a woman. Our basic reason for supporting this is to 
maintain the sanctity of marriage.”17  However, some religious groups actually came out 
opposing the gay marriage ban in Ohio. Pastors and Rabbis, including gay and lesbian 
ministers, gathered to demonstrate their opposition to Issue One, characterizing the policy 
as "cruel," "unholy," and "heinous." Furthermore, faith leaders from the United Church of 
Christ would not support Issue One, believing that Christ would not want the church to be 
                                                 
17Briggs, David (2004). “Same-sex marriage is No. 1 in minds of religious groups.” The Plain Dealer. 29 
Oct 2004. A12.  
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exclusionary.18  Despite strong religious opposition from these church leaders, and 
warnings from Ohio's U.S. Senators DeWine and Voinovich and Governor Bob Taft 
about the economic implications if the amendment were adopted, Ohio's measure passed 
with a 61.8% majority. In the end, all eleven state amendments passed with a significant 
amount of the popular vote.19 
Some have argued that wedge issues have a considerable impact on the public, 
particularly on voting behavior, where they can generate single-issue voters. Conover, 
Gray, and Coombs define a single issue as the any issue that causes a public or person to 
allow their participation in politics to be guided by that one issue. Some have suggested 
that many voters based their choice of candidate solely on wedge issues during the 2004 
election. According to CNN.com, exit polls showed that the largest percentage of voters, 
22%, named "moral values," which many wedge issue debates are based upon, as the 
election's most important issue. Some formerly heavily Democratic neighborhoods in 
Brooklyn, New York, voted Republican based on beliefs about moral issues such as gay 
marriage and abortion.20  Eighty percent of those who based their votes on one or more 
"moral value" voted for Bush.21 
Wedge issues are also prominent in Congressional campaigns. If it is assumed 
that one of the primary goals of any member of Congress is to be reelected, wedge issues 
may also play a role in the behavior of members of Congress. In order to appeal to the 
voters in his or her home district, a member of Congress may take actions such as credit 
                                                 
18 Briggs, David (2004). “Same-sex marriage is No. 1 in minds of religious groups.” The Plain Dealer. 29 
Oct 2004. A12. 
19 National Conference of State Legislatures (2004). “Same-sex Marriage Measures on the 2004 Ballots.” 
20 Farrel, Bill (2004). “Boro’s heart turns red in shift from 2000, Voters go big for Bush.” New York Daily 
News. 7 Nov 2004: Suburban section, page 1. 
21 Bothelo, Greg (2004). “Exit polls: Electorate is sharply divided.” CNN.com. 
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claiming or opposition taking.22  If an MC claims credit, he or she may assert 
responsibility for a specialized action that took place in a unit of Congress—amending a 
bill about gun control in committee, for example. When a member of Congress position 
takes, he or she will publicly state his or her opinion about an issue that is of interest to 
voters—voting "yes" or "no" on a controversial issue in a role call vote, or announcing 
that he or she will support the president on an issue that is important to his or her 
constituency.23 
Members of Congress may also have other goals that wedge issues might 
influence. First, many representatives are genuinely interested in creating and 
implementing good public policy.24  Representatives from California in both Chambers 
may be interested in sponsoring or co-sponsoring initiatives concerning stem cell 
research, especially since voters their districts approved Issue 71 in November, a ballot 
initiative that allows for $3 billion in California tax dollars to be spent supporting the 
research.25  Second, most members of Congress are interested in broadening the scope of 
their personal power, and may do so by earning the support of their party due to their 
positions on many issues, including wedge issues. Furthermore, once a representative 
gains power, such as minority/majority leader in either Chamber or Speaker of the House, 
he or she will be forced to take strong stands on wedge issues, as well as determine 
whether an issue will appear on the legislative agenda. 
Interest groups, defined by Washington Representatives as "persons working to 
influence government policies and actions to advance their own and their client's 
                                                 




25 Bruck, Connie (2004). “Hollywood Science.” The New Yorker. 18 Oct 2004: 62. 
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interest," form around single issues to lobby all three braches of government, especially 
Congress.26  For example, one very powerful interest group, the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) and its lobbying arm, the Institute for Legislative Action (ILA), have 
formed for the purpose of promoting and defending the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms. The NRA boasts more than 4 million members on whom they depend to contact 
members of Congress when legislation involving gun rights is proposed. The ILA 
employs professional lobbyists whose campaigns on Capitol Hill include "enacting laws 
that recognize the rights of honest citizens to carry firearms for self-protection; 
preemption bills to prevent attacks on gun owner rights by local anti-gun politicians, and 
fighting for legislation to prevent the bankrupting of America's firearms industry through 
reckless lawsuits.”27  This is just one example of an interest group that has formed around 
a wedge issue in Washington. 
Wedge issues have even made their way into hearings by the United States 
Supreme Court. Perhaps the most famous wedge issue decision was Roe v. Wade in 
1973. The Roe ruling was an attempt to answer the abortion questions about a woman's 
privacy and when life begins. The opinion of the Court, issued by Justice Blackmun, 
declared that states could not restrict the ability of a woman to have an abortion within 
the first three months of her pregnancy. Blackmun pointed out the debate the issue raised: 
"We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the 
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the 
deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires." Roe v. Wade is still a 
contentious issue today, and with the possibility of President Bush appointing as many as 
                                                 
26 Wright, John R. (2003). Interest Groups and Congress. New York: Longman. 
27 NRAILA.org (2005). Interest group website. 
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four Supreme Court Justices during his second term, there are speculations that President 
will select new justices that may potentially overturn the decision. 
 In the legislative branch, the division of government with which this project is 
concerned, members of Congress cast votes for or against proposed legislation—wedge 
issues and non-wedge issues alike.  In order to study representation, it is extremely 
important to study voting behavior, as it is the means by which a member of Congress 
represents his or her constituency. Examining the pattern of role call behavior and the 
changes in that pattern has two purposes.  First, it provides answers about how accurately 
a member of Congress is representing his or her district.  Second, it can provide clues 
about the goals of a member of Congress by demonstrating whether that member is 
aligning his or her votes with the party, the district, or perhaps a personal policy goal.     
 The argument that members of Congress act as delegates when dealing with 
wedge issues may be problematic due to Morris P. Fiorina’s 2004 study, Culture War: 
the Myth of a Polarized America.  Fiorina argues that the American population is, in fact, 
not deeply divided on controversial issues, including abortion and gay rights.  The media, 
he states, is largely responsible for the perception among the American population that 
there is a huge difference between people living in “blue” liberal areas and “red” 
conservative areas.  If Fiorina is correct, that Americans are moderate even on 
traditionally divisive issues, then factors other than constituency opinion may be 
influencing representatives. 
When one thinks of the so-called “culture war” taking place in the United States 
today—a deep division over issues among the population—abortion is often the first 
issue to come to mind.  There are few for whom pictures of avid protests from pro-lifers 
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and pro-choice advocates, abortion clinic bombings, and horrifying tales of back-alley 
abortions would not quickly become visible in the mind’s eye.  Though these images are 
thought to reflect a large divide in the American public, they actually best represent the 
views of the polarized and tremendously vocal factions from the extreme right and left.  
The conflict exists within these factions, and with the political elite.  The American 
public, however, takes a much more moderate stance, favoring legal abortion with 
reasonable regulations.  The public largely agrees that abortion should be allowed in 
cases involving trauma, such incest, rape, life or health of the mother, or extreme birth 
defects; while imposing tougher restrictions for abortions motivated by social reasons, 
including that the mother is not married and does not want to marry the man, or the 
mother does not want any more children.28 
The following chart depicts the attitudes of Americans toward the issue of 
abortion when asked the following question:29 
Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant 
woman to obtain a legal abortion if: 
1. the woman’s health is seriously endangered 
2. she became pregnant as a result of rape 
3. there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby 
4. the family has low income and cannot afford any more children 
5. she is not married and does not want to marry the man 
6. she is married and does not want any more children 
 
                                                 





Large majorities of Americans support abortion in the first three situations, while the last 
three are typically favored by a minority, though this minority includes a significant 
number of Americans.30 
Fiorina’s argument about abortion flies in the face of the popular belief that 
Americans are deeply divided over at least one wedge issue.  Issues involving 
homosexuality have traditionally been a divisive issue in the U.S., though they have not 
been on the agenda for the length of time that abortion issues have.  There has been a 
shift in public opinion since the 1980s when the majority of the American public felt that 
homosexual relations should be illegal.  Today, the population does not see the value in 
                                                 
30 Fiorina, Morris P. (2005) Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman. 
pp. 34-37. 
Source: Fiorina, Morris P. (2005) Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman..
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criminalizing private sexual acts, though roughly 60% of Americans believe that 
homosexuality is wrong.  However, there are divisions over gay marriage, which became 
a hot-button issue in 2004 when marriage licenses became available in Massachusetts and 
San Francisco.  A federal amendment banning gay marriage was introduced in Congress 
in the summer of 2004, but it failed to rally public support; however, eleven gay marriage 
initiatives to ban gay marriage through state constitutional amendments passed in the 
November 2004 elections. 
Fiorina’s study, though very a very interesting explanation of public opinion and 
the fabricated culture war, may not be particularly helpful for this study.  Fiorina 
examines public opinion at the state and national level, while this project is interested in 
public opinion at the district level.  Fiorina states several times that there are regional 
differences in opinion—blue areas in the northeast, an area heavily populated by 
Catholics, may not be as liberal as blue areas on the west coast, for example.  
Furthermore, Fiorina does not necessarily measure the intensity of opinions in the areas 
he studies.  A state may appear to be “purple” as he demonstrates in the most recent 
publication of his study, but it is a measure of aggregate opinion.  If the citizens of the 
state are strongly divided, a “culture war” may still exist.  An interesting way to view the 
breakdown of red versus blue areas in the U.S. is to look at a map put together by 
Princeton University called “Purple America.”  This map, though it depicts votes by 
county for president, may be a good predictor of which areas in the U.S. will feel strongly 
about certain wedge issues, and may be useful to representatives simply because it is 
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broken down to a small level.31  However, intensity of opinion is still an important factor 





Leading Congressional scholar John W. Kingdon presents six models of 
legislative voting that members of Congress follow when making public policy decisions.  
Kingdon asserts that representatives must make complex decisions with limited time and 
information, and these models work together in order to help the representatives make 
difficult decisions—the decision rules allow for simplified choices.  The first model is 
cue taking, a strategy that allows representatives to cut information and time costs by 
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voting in the same way as a like-minded and better informed congressional colleague.  
The U.S. committee system in Congress allows for representatives to specialize in certain 
areas, therefore, many legislators rely on others to determine how they should vote in 
areas in which they themselves are not specialists.   
 “Policy Dimensions” is Kingdon’s second model of legislative voting.  This idea 
states that a congressman comes to the table with certain perceptions and attitudes about 
the issue at hand—this is known as the first dimension.  The member of Congress then 
compares that position to the position laid out in the wording of the legislation—the 
legislation itself is the second dimension.  The congressman bases his vote—yea or nay—
upon how the legislation fits his position.  Kingdon states at this point that when the 
legislation concerns civil liberties, that the congressman will weigh heavily the views of 
his constituency, though his party is more important when governmental affairs such as 
the economy are on the agenda. 
The third is called the predisposition-communication model, which states that a 
congressman measures the strength of his predisposition toward an issue based on his 
past behavior and voting record, the position of his party, and the effects the issue will 
have on his constituency.  If his predisposition is strong, he will vote along with it.  If it is 
not, an elaborate process of communication with colleagues, party leadership, and 
constituents follows until he reaches a decision. 
The consensus model, the fourth, states that if there is no controversy over an 
issue or a bill, a member of Congress will vote with the consensus.  When contention 
arises over the proposed legislation, the calculus becomes much more complex, and the 
member of Congress will weigh other factors into his vote choice. 
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The past behavior model assumes that a congressman’s decisions are related to 
past behavior.  Once a member of Congress has established a voting record on an issue, 
he will generally continue to vote the same way when that issue comes to a vote.  If he 
does change his position, it will be gradually and incrementally to avoid the appearance 
of his vote being easily swayed.32  Presidential candidate John Kerry, for example, was 
labeled a “flip-flopper” by the Bush campaign in 2004 for changing his position on the 
Iraq War by voting in favor of the war, then opposing funding for the war.33  
Finally, Kingdon presents the goals model, which asserts that members of 
Congress vote in accordance with their goals.  These goals include re-election, as 
Mayhew presented in Congress: the Electoral Connection, as well as a desire to gain 
power and influence in Washington, and instituting what the representative believes is 
good public policy. 
Kingdon states that the six models are not conflicting, but in fact work together to 
assist legislators.  However, he seems to prescribe to the assertion that members of 
Congress make their decisions based on the goals model.  First, a representative desires to 
satisfy her constituents.  Not only did the constituency enable her to achieve office, but 
the constituency is also responsible for keeping the representatives in office when she 
runs for reelection—therefore, she will do their best to please her district, especially 
when issues are highly visible and salient.  When considering her vote on an issue, the 
member of Congress will take into account the reaction of the district she represents, as 
well as the gain or loss of votes her position on an issue will mean for her in the next 
                                                 
32 Kingdon, John W. (1977). “Models of Legislative Voting.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Aug., 
1977), p. 567. 
33 Harris, John F. (2004). “Despite Bush Flip-Flops, Kerry gets Label.” The Washington Post. 23 
September 2004. p. A1. 
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election.  Next, members of Congress are generally interested in gaining influence and 
power within the government.  Leadership positions in Washington enable a 
representative to “bring home the bacon” to her district, which is extremely helpful in a 
reelection bid.  This can be done by voting along with the positions of the 
representative’s party leadership, favor trading, or following the preferences of the 
president perhaps to gain an appointment.  Finally, the voting decisions of members of 
Congress can be motivated by a genuine interest in making what they believe is good 
public policy.  Policy attitudes and ideology affect the representative’s decision, and 
previous behavior also weighs in because the representative’s voting record defines her 
traditional position on the issue at hand—the voting record is the “more than words” of 
the legislature. 
When calculating a decision, Kingdon argues, a member of Congress begins at the 
lowest level possible—if a “decision rule” can be applied, he applies it immediately.  
This generally occurs when an issue is not controversial.  When an issue is contentious, 
he moves on to a more complicated method of decision making.  Kingdon’s table 
demonstrating the path members of Congress take to reach decisions follows.34 
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Kingdon describes the path that a legislator will follow when a controversial issue 
is at hand: 
If one or more goals are important enough, he asks if there is conflict among the 
goals which have been evoked…If there is some conflict among the goals which 
the legislator considers relevant to his decision, he proceeds implicitly to some 
decision rules which help him sort out the conflicts and make a satisfactory 
choice…the congressman considers the constituency interest first.  He may not 
end up voting with the constituency, but he always considers it when it is above 
the minimal level of importance.  Placing this goal first is in keeping with the fact 
that the congressman owes his tenure in office to his constituency…If the issue is 
of high salience, and if constituency is a relevant consideration, the model 
postulates that in view of the likelihood that important constituents will notice and 
disapprove of a vote out of keeping with their interests, the constituency 
consideration will dominate.35 
 
Therefore, the constituency is the most important factor when a congressman considers 
his vote on an issue that is both salient and controversial. 
According to the research of some scholars, political parties have the most 
influential role in congressional decision making.  Due to their importance in the calculus 
of voting decisions of members of Congress, it is important to study them in this review 
of congressional voting behavior.  Samuel C. Patterson and Gregory A. Caldeira 
examined trends in party voting in the U.S. Congress.  Party voting can be defined as a 
vote in which “majorities of the two congressional parties, the Democrats and 
Republicans, oppose one another.”36  According to Patterson and Caldeira, party cleavage 
in the U.S. is moderate when compared to other political systems around the world for 
two reasons.  First, party divisions do not run deep among American citizens—many 
Americans consider themselves Independents rather than identifying themselves with the 
Democratic or Republican Party.  Second, the separation of the executive and legislative 
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branches of government means that parties in the legislature can be more lenient with 
their discipline since the head of state is not derived from the legislature. 
Patterson and Caldeira found that members’ of Congress willingness to vote with 
their party changes in intensity throughout time.  First they noted that significant party 
realignment, such as the Democratic realignment of 1932, will increase party voting for 
several years, after which party support begins to dwindle.  The strength and 
centralization of party leadership in Congress can also contribute to a rise in party voting.  
A powerful Speaker of the House, for example, may have the power to sway the votes of 
members of his party through promises or threats.  Finally, party voting is stronger in the 
first session of a Congress—the non-election year—than in the second session when 
representatives are campaigning and attempting to court their constituencies.   
The authors argue that the party loyalty of members of Congress respond to both 
exogenous and endogenous forces.  In other words, internal factors such as the 
composition of the membership, procedural rules, leadership opportunities and the 
agenda, as well as external factors including the will of the electorate, influence the party 
alignment of legislators.  Congress is neither a body reliant completely upon the wills and 
whims of various constituencies, nor is it entirely an exclusive club in which members 
make decisions based on the rules of the game. 
The electoral and partisan context provides more opportunity to explain when and 
why party voting takes place.  First, Patterson and Caldeira assert that when national 
parties stand opposite one another on the “great issues of their time,” high levels of 
partisan voting will follow.37  On the same note, partisan voting is likely to decrease as 
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 31
conflict on the national scale decreases.  Next, when the presidency and the majority of 
seats in either the House or Senate are held by the same party, party voting will rise for 
several reasons.  First, the President’s agenda tends to dominate the legislative agenda 
because his colleagues in party leadership positions in the legislature set the said agenda.  
Second, the President can give the leaders of his party extra leverage with which to 
increase party voting—the rank and file party membership can be coerced to fall in line.  
Finally, the minority party may become more cohesive, causing even more polarization 
between the parties.  This is quite likely what is taking place in the legislative branch at 
the current time as Republicans control the presidency and both houses of the legislature.  
Democrats appear to have become quite cohesive in their fight against the majority, 
engaging in several filibusters and attempting to regain control of Congress in 2006.  
Patterson and Caldeira also state that when districts favor a representative and a president 
from the same party, party voting will increase.  On the other hand, representatives whose 
districts are split are less likely to vote along party lines. 
The authors argue that four independent variables affect the degree of partisan 
cleavages in Congress.  The relative size of the majority and minority are important 
because party voting runs higher when the majority is large—partisan cohesiveness is 
stimulated in both the majority and the minority in such cases.  Party voting is higher 
when the positions of Republicans and Democrats within their parties are homogeneous 
and opposed to the opposite party.  The level of support for the President is also a 
factor—partisan polarization can decline if there is strong bi-partisan support for the 
President, such as in times of war.  The previous record of party voting also affects 
partisan cleavages because Congress changes at a slow rate, and the degree of partisan 
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cleavage present in the previous session is often a model for the degree of partisan 
cleavage in the current session. 
Perhaps the most important implication of this research is the finding that 
members of Congress are less likely to vote along party lines during election years.  This 
lends credibility to the notion that the main goal of representatives is to be reelected, and 
signifies that they are willing to break with their parties in order to please their 
constituencies.  This fact demonstrates that, while party may generally be the most 
important influence on a member of Congress’s voting decision, there are times when 
constituency desires outweigh party loyalty. 
A more recent study of the influence of parties by Gregory L. Hager and Jeffery 
C. Talbert, examines the affects of party upon the decisions of members of Congress.  
Hager and Talbert assert that in modern congresses, party is highly correlated with 
ideology.  Furthermore, they argue that party is an important heuristic for voters, and that 
members of Congress might be willing to vacate their own preferences for those of the 
party, at least sometimes, in order to increase their chances of reelection.  According to 
Hager and Talbert, party voting is on the rise in Congress.  However, this finding may be 
due to the fact that parties have become more ideologically homogenous within their 
membership in recent years.   
Party certainly does have an important role to play in the reelection of members of 
Congress.  However, the effects of party influence may be weaker on substantive 
decisions such as role-call voting than they have been in past.  Representatives assume 
that constituents are generally knowledgeable of only a few key votes.  The public pays 
attention to the voting behavior of their representative; therefore the representative has a 
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vested interest in pleasing his or her constituency on these key votes.  Though the voting 
behavior is important, the representative’s party identification remains a brand name that 
the electorate can use as a short-cut to determine the candidate’s likely record and 
ideology.  Therefore, a member of Congress should be concerned with public reaction to 
a few specific votes, as well as the perception of his or her party by his constituents. 
Members of Congress today generally do not rely on party funds for reelection as 
legislators of the past did.  Therefore, representatives have less incentive to consistently 
vote along party lines; rather, they are most likely to vote with their constituents on most 
bills.  However, party reputation is a collective good which the entire party should be 
interested in preserving.  The Republican Party of the current 109th Congress, for 
example, has had its reputation damaged by alleged corruption amongst its important 
leadership, such as the indictment of Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-TX) for supposed 
campaign finance violations, as well as the accusation of several prominent Republicans 
of receiving illegal contributions from lobbyists.   
Political parties are a means for political actors to achieve their goals.  Voting 
along party lines can assist a representative in gaining influence in Washington, which 
can, in turn, allow her to bring specialized benefits to her district or implement important 
policy—benefits which can both be used to strengthen a campaign for reelection.  This 
phenomenon is likely what is taking place among California Republicans concerning 
stem cell research.  Following the approval of a stem cell research referendum, eight 
California Republicans modified their stances on stem cell research from disapproval to 
approval in order to align with their districts counter to the stance of the national 
Republican Party and Republican leadership.  Five other California Republicans, whose 
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districts approved the referendum, nearly all by at least ten percentage points, did not 
change their votes.  Each of these representatives received an important committee or 
presidential appointment in either 2003 or 2005, which may be indicative of the notion 
that one must maintain the party’s positions or party loyalty in order to gain power within 
the party.   
Perhaps the most important finding of Hager and Talbert is that party influence is 
likely drowned out by constituency preferences on key or controversial votes.  This 
implies that, while party is influential, representatives are most concerned with pleasing 
their electorate in order to gain reelection.   
As a side note, Gerber and Lewis (2004) also determined that party pressures 
dominate legislative behavior when a representative’s district is heterogeneous.  In other 
words, if many voters in an electorate think alike, their representative is more restricted to 
voting along the lines of the electorate.  Representatives whose districts have many types 
of voters who think in many different ways are less confined by the district’s aggregate 
opinion, and often vote along party lines. 
Representation is an extremely complex process involving both the representative 
and the represented, and many factors contribute to the way in which a representative 
carries out his or her duty.  Representatives feel pressure from every direction when they 
make decisions, and no two issues are alike.  This project examines the issue of stem cell 
research and its effect on the behavior of members of Congress.  Stem cell research is an 
important issue in the United States. Considerable medical advances may be made 
possible by the study, and the issue has also produced significant debate in U.S. political 
system. Stem cell research is based on the stem cell, which is an unspecialized cell that 
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can potentially develop into any other cell, organ or tissue in the human body. Stem cells 
can be found in adult tissues such as umbilical cord, placenta, bone marrow, and baby 
teeth, as well as in human embryos. Embryonic stem cell research has been limited due to 
an executive order President Bush issued in 2001 that disallowed federal funding for 
study on embryos that were destroyed after August 2001. The science community was 
left with about 19 unstable, replicating embryonic stem cell lines, though research using 
adult stem cells was encouraged to continue. Scientists hope that in time stem cells will 
be a treatment for diseases such as Alzheimer's, cancer, diabetes and Parkinson's. 
Furthermore, doctors anticipate the alleviation of organ donation shortages by developing 
stem cells into any human organ and using those organs for patients requiring 
transplants.38 
It remains open for debate whether stem cell research merits the status of “wedge 
issue.”  It is often classified as such in the media, but must be put to the five question test 
to determine whether this classification is correct. 
 1. Is there a great deal of public awareness about the issue?  
Stem cell research is a topic with particularly high public awareness, though it is 
relatively new to the political scene. Prior to President Bush’s announcement concerning 
federal funding for embryonic stem cell lines in 2001, "significant" media coverage of the 
stem cell issue was limited. However, following the President's televised decision to limit 
funding to lines that had been created prior to August 9, 2001, polls suggested that 40-
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60% of Americans were following the issue closely or somewhat closely.39  Though 
public awareness of the stem cell issue fell dramatically in 2002 and 2003, it surfaced 
again in 2004 as the presidential and congressional elections neared. 
According to a 2004 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center and the Pew 
Forum on Religion and Public life, 85% of Americans reported having heard at least "a 
little" about the issue of stem cell research; half of those respondents admitted to having 
heard "a lot" about the debate. Those numbers are up from 2002 when only 27% of the 
population answered that they had heard "a lot" about stem cell research.   The 2004 
presidential election also brought stem cell research to the spotlight at the second debate. 
Additionally, celebrities who suffer from injuries and illnesses, such as the late 
Christopher Reeve and Michael J. Fox, have appeared in advertisements promoting stem 
cell research.  This differs from an issue such as agricultural subsidies.  Though federally 
sponsored agricultural subsidies affect the entire nation (and farmers especially), they are 
not generally talked about in the media, and the public most likely knows very little about 
them. 
2. Is the issue divisive, especially along moral or ethical cleavages? 
Stem cell research is a controversial issue because of the ethical questions 
involved. There are no moral reservations regarding adult stem cell research because it 
does not require the destruction of a potential human life. On the other hand, embryonic 
research must terminate the existence of an embryo in order to extract the stem cells. The 
2004 presidential candidates summed up the debate very well. Senator Kerry argued, "I 
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believe if we have the option, which scientists tell us we do, of curing Parkinson's, curing 
diabetes, curing a spinal cord injury — anything — that's the nature of the human spirit. I 
think it is respecting life to reach for that cure." President Bush, in his response, said, 
"Embryonic stem cell research requires the destruction of life to create a stem cell. To 
destroy life to save life is one of the real ethical dilemmas that we face. But as well, we 
need to continue to pursue adult stem cell research."40  The debate is clearly ethical in 
nature, as stem cell research involves questions of who will live and who will die. 
Most embryonic stem cells are extracted from leftover embryos created for in 
vitro fertilization; the embryos can only be used with the donors' consent. Embryonic 
stem cells are able to adapt into more types of cells than adult stem cells, therefore stem 
cell advocates believe that new embryonic stem cell research should receive federal 
support. However, right-to-life groups argue that the destruction of a five-day-old embryo 
extinguishes a human life, and that such practices should be illegal, or at the very least, 
not funded by taxpayer dollars. 
There is also disagreement about whether therapeutic cloning is an acceptable 
process for obtaining stem cell lines. Therapeutic cloning replaces the nucleus of a human 
egg cell with the nucleus of another cell from the body. After four to five days, stem cells 
are extracted and the embryo is destroyed. Scientists hope that this form of stem cell 
withdrawal will eliminate the possibility of patients' immune systems rejecting tissues 
derived from stem cells, because the stem cells would come from a cell in the patients' 
own bodies. This process does not lead to any sort of reproduction, but some opponents 
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of the method fear the reproductive possibilities of cloning, and do not wish to advance 
cloning technology in any way. 
3. Is there emotional symbolism attached to the issue? 
Stem cell research is a highly symbolized issue. To understand the symbols that 
are used by groups on both sides of the argument, it must be understood how the issue is 
framed. Conservatives are generally against embryonic stem cell research, and they link 
the issue to abortion. They symbolize their position characterizing an embryo as a living, 
innocent human being that is destroyed before it has the chance to live.41 Liberals, who 
are most in favor of embryonic stem cell research, see the dilemma as a health issue. 
They characterize the embryo as "material," and point to the cures and treatments that 
stem cell research makes possible that will improve the lives of many diseased or 
otherwise debilitated citizens (NewsHour, 2004). 
Both liberal and conservative groups have formed around the issue, and engage in 
passionate discussion of the pros and cons of stem cell research. The Christian Coalition 
of America, for example, has mobilized its grassroots to contact Senators and 
representatives who oppose President Bush's policy on embryonic stem cell research. On 
their website, the group discusses its feeling concerning the use of adult versus 
embryonic stem cells, 
Just over 200 Members of the House, including some pro-life Republicans and 
Democrats, have signed a letter to President Bush asking him to repeal his policy 
on federal funding for embryo stem cell research and basically to encourage 
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destruction of new human embryos for stem cell research. There is zero need for 
such a change in policy.42 
 
On the other hand, the liberal group NARAL Pro-Choice America has issued a petition 
that they hope will influence President Bush's policy on stem cell research. They give 
their assessment of the President's position: 
President Bush has refused to allow this promising science to move ahead. Why? 
Because Bush has shown that he's incapable of setting aside his anti-choice 
politics for the good of our country. Bush's policy has shackled development of 
new treatments for diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, cancer, and 
diabetes.43 
 
Both groups use emotionally charged language to emphasize their support or opposition 
to the issue, revealing their passion for policy outcomes that reflect their side's views.  
4. Do politicians focus mainly on policy ends or policy means? 
Legislators make judgmental statements about all kinds of legislation that comes 
through Congress; some of these judgments deal with governmental means, and some 
deal with governmental ends. If a congressman or congresswoman issues an opinion 
concerning means, he or she is addressing the way he or she feels the government should 
handle some issue: The way to save embryos is to cut federal funding for stem cell 
research. On the other hand, when focusing on ends, he or she is stating what he or she 
feels the results of governmental policy should be: The government should support 
embryonic stem cell research.44  According to Carmines and Stimson (1980), when a 
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wedge or "easy" issue is involved, it is expected that the issue will generally deal with 
policy ends rather than means. 
When it comes to stem cell research, it is not clear that politicians are making judgmental 
statements that deal with policy ends. The basis of the debate on Capitol Hill is whether 
or not taxpayer dollars should be funding a practice that some taxpayers view as 
unethical. Therefore, many of the statements made about stem cell research involve how 
money should be spent, which as a governmental means statement. For example, 
Representative Diana DeGette, a stem cell research advocate, says: "We need to have a 
federal policy that not only allows for complete funding for all stem cell lines, but also 
puts strict ethical controls.”45  Senator Sam Brownback, who opposes stem cell research 
on embryos, states: "We're having phenomenal success in adult stem cells. Let's follow 
that and let's increase that money.”46  Rather than promoting a position for or against 
stem cell research, the positions taken by law makers generally favor or oppose federal 
spending for the research. 
5. Has the issue been part of the public agenda for a sustained period?  
It is difficult to argue that stem cell research has been on the public agenda for a 
long period of time, because it is a very new science—it was only in 1998 that human 
stem cells were first isolated. However, the ethics behind the stem cell dilemma can be 
traced back to the 1970s and the abortion question. The basis of opposition to both 
abortion and embryonic stem cell research is the question "When does a fertilized cell 
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become a life?" Some conservative religious die-hards believe that life begins at 
conception, while some pro-choice extremists believe that a fetus is not alive until it exits 
the mother's womb. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found in its poll that 
52% of Bush supporters favored protection of the embryo to furthering scientific research 
in 2004, while 67% of Kerry voters believed that conducting research was more 
important than saving embryos. 
(6. Does the issue divide a like-minded electorate?) 
It has also been suggested that a wedge issue is one that can divide a typically 
cohesive group.  Stem cell research often divides members of the Republican Party.  
Nancy Reagan, a Republican, has been an avid supporter of embryonic stem cell 
research, while other conservative Republicans have been the strongest opponents to 
allowing the federal government to fund the science.  Democrats on the other hand 
typically are very supportive of all forms of stem cell research, including embryonic and 
somatic cell nuclear transfer. 
Stem cell research does not seem to be a wedge issue in the whole sense.  Though 
the issue is divisive, emotional, and highly public, its focus on policy means and limited 
time on the legislative agenda separate it from other wedge issues.  Further study and an 
empirical test are necessary to determine whether stem cell research is a true wedge issue.  
However, stem cell research itself remains highly controversial, and might provide an 
interesting study of legislative behavior concerning wedge issue or wedge-issue-like 
topics. 
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The legislative behavior examined in this project is based on three floor votes 
taken in the U.S. House of Representatives and a statewide referendum from California.  
Two of the bills, H.R. 2505 and H.R. 534, reached the floor prior to the 2004 election.  
California Proposition 71 was voted upon by the people of California in the 2004 
election.  The final bill, H.R. 810, came to the floor as a roll call vote in May 2005.  This 
situation provides for a unique natural experiment.  Did representatives change their vote 
on stem cell research following Proposition 71, which supplied a very good cue to the 
representatives about the preferences of their districts?  
No bills directly concerning stem cell research reached a floor vote prior to the 
November 2004 election.  Several were introduced; however, none made it past 
committee.  Therefore, this study is based on floor votes on bills that concern human 
cloning, which is related to stem cell research.  It is not perfect—there is certainly a 
possibility that a representative could disapprove of cloning but support stem cell 
research.  However, support for stem cell research is closely linked with cloning, because 
embryonic stem cells can be cloned and used for research purposes, and many advocates 
of stem cell research would like to see the government allow researchers to pursue studies 
involving cloned cells. 
The passage of Proposition 71 allowed for a California Institute of Regenerative 
Medicine to regulate stem cell research, as well as issue grants to the universities and 
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laboratories conducting it at a cost of $3 billion to California taxpayers.  The measure 
was approved by a margin of 59.1 percent to 40.9 percent.47 
House of Representatives bill 810 was a landmark bill for stem cell research.  It 
was the first bill to reach a floor vote, which took place May 24, 2005.  This legislation, 
sponsored by Diana DeGette (D, CO) and Michael Castle (R, DE), would have allowed 
excess embryos from in vitro fertilization clinics to be donated for research purposes with 
the consent of the parents of the embryo.  H.R. 810 passed in the House by a vote of 238-
194; however, it never reached the Senate floor and did not become law. 
The following data table displays the name and district of each California member 
of the U.S. House of Representatives, his or her party, the percent of the vote he or she 
received in the 2004 election, the member’s vote on each of the three bills, and the 
percentage of the member’s district that voted yes or no on Proposition 71.  
Representatives highlighted in yellow (McKeon, Dreier, Lewis, Calvert, Bono, 
Rohrabacher, Issa, Cunningham) voted in alignment with their district following the 
passage of Proposition 71.  Those highlighted in blue (Pombo, Gallegly, Royce, Cox, 
Hunter) did not vote in-line with their district following their district’s approval of 
Proposition 71.  The lone purple highlight, Thomas, was a case in which the 
representative voted out of alignment with his district after his district rejected 
Proposition 71. 
California Representatives and Their Votes 









Prop 71 % 
Yes 
Prop 71 % 
No 
                                                 
47 California Secretary of State. 
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1 Thompson, Mike D 67 N N Y 59.5 40.5 
2 Herger, Wally R 66.9 Y Y N 47 53 
3 Lungren, Daniel R 62     N 49.2 50.8 
4 Doolittle, John R 65.4 Y Y N 47.6 52.4 
5 Matsui, Doris D 71.4     Y 58.2 41.8 
6 Woolsey, Lynn D 72.7 N N Y 64.3 35.7 
7 Miller, George D 76.1 N N Y 66.1 33.9 
8 Pelosi, Nancy D 83 N N Y 71.7 28.3 
9 Lee, Barbara D 84.6 N N Y 70.2 29.8 
10 Tauscher, Ellen D 65.8 N N Y 64.1 35.9 
11 Pombo, Richard R 61.3 Y Y N 55.5 44.5 
12 Lantos, Tom D 68.1 N N Y 69.5 30.5 
13 Stark, Fortney Pete D 71.7 NV N Y 67.2 32.8 
14 Eshoo, Anna D 69.8 N N Y 67.8 32.2 
15 Honda, Michael D 72.1 N N Y 65.6 34.4 
16 Lofgren, Zoe D 70.9 N N Y 65.9 34.1 
17 Farr, Sam D 66.8 N N Y 68.1 31.9 
18 Cardoza, Dennis D 67.5   N Y 49.7 50.3 
19 Radanovich, George R 66.1 Y Y N 46.6 53.4 
20 Costa, Jim D 53.5     Y 50.8 49.2 
21 Nunes, Devin R 73.2   Y N 43.4 56.6 
22 Thomas, William R 100 Y Y Y 45.8 54.2 
23 Capps, Lois D 63.1 N N Y 60.6 39.4 
24 Gallegly, Elton R 62.9 Y NV N 54.8 45.2 
25 McKeon, Buck R 64.5 Y Y Y 52.2 47.8 
26 Dreier, David R 53.6 Y Y Y 54 46 
27 Sherman, Brad D 62.3 N N Y 62.9 37.1 
28 Berman, Howard D 71 N N Y 70.8 29.2 
29 Schiff, Adam D 64.7 N N Y 62.4 37.6 
30 Waxman, Henry D 71.3 N N Y 73.5 26.5 
31 Becerra, Xavier D 80.3 N N Y 70.3 29.7 
32 Solis, Hilda D 85.1 N N Y 61.6 38.4 
33 Watson, Diane D 88.6 N N Y 75.9 24.1 
34 Roybal-Allard, Lucille D 74.5 N N Y 64.9 35.1 
35 Waters, Maxine D 80.6 N NV Y 70.8 29.2 
36 Harman, Jane D 62 N N Y 63.5 36.5 
37 
Millender-McDonald, 
Juanita D 75.1 N NV NV 68 32 
38 Napolitano, Grace D 100 N N Y 61.7 38.3 
39 Sanchez, Linda D 60.7   N Y 58.1 41.9 
40 Royce, Edward R 68 Y Y N 50.5 49.5 
41 Lewis, Jerry R 83 Y Y Y 50.4 49.6 
42 Miller, Gary R 68.2 Y NV N 49.7 50.3 
43 Baca, Joe D 66.4 N NV Y 56.4 43.6 
44 Calvert, Ken R 61.7 Y Y Y 52.8 47.2 
45 Bono, Mary R 66.7 Y Y Y 55.8 44.2 
46 Rohrabacher, Dana R 62 Y Y Y 54.3 45.7 
47 Sanchez, Loretta D 60.4 N NV Y 54 46 
48 Cox, Christopher R 65 Y Y N 54.9 45.1 
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49 Issa, Darrell R 62.6 Y Y Y 52 48 
50 Cunningham, Duke R 58.5 Y Y Y 57.6 42.4 
51 Filner, Bob D 61.7 N N Y 58.2 41.8 
52 Hunter, Duncan R 69.2 Y Y N 54.6 45.4 
53 Davis, Susan D 66.2 N N Y 66.9 33.1 
 
The easiest way to analyze the data is to break it down on a case-by-case basis, 
starting with those legislators in blue who voted out of alignment with their districts, even 
though in these districts, Proposition 71 was approved with a median of 9.6 percentage 
points.  All of these representatives share important similarities.  First, they are all 
Republican incumbents who seem to be in “safe” districts—that is, they won the last 
election with more than 60% of the vote.48  Representatives who win their seats in 
Congress by a large margin may be less concerned with pleasing their districts because 
they do not feel the pressure of a close election.49   
Next, each representative seems to be fairly heavily involved with the Republican 
Party and its leadership.  Richard Pombo was appointed Chairman of the House 
Resources Committee in 2003, and received the position over several more senior 
colleagues.50  Elton Gallegly was personally appointed by Speaker of the House Dennis 
Hastert (R-IL) to serve on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 2003.  Ed 
Royce, who serves on the Financial Services Committee and the Committee on 
International Relations, chairs the subcommittee on Terrorism.  Chris Cox was appointed 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission by President Bush in 2005.  
                                                 
48 Pombo, Gallegly, Royce, Cox and Hunter won their 2004 bids for re-election with an average of 65.28% 
of the vote. 
49 Mayhew, David R. (2004). Congress: The Electoral Connection.  Second Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
50 A further connection with Republican leadership, Pombo has also been likened to the Abramhoff 
scandal, though he has not been indicted.  
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Finally, Duncan Hunter serves as chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  
The Republican Party leadership, especially in the House, has taken a strong stand 
against federal funding for embryonic stem cell research, and these representatives have 
aligned themselves with the position of the Republican leadership.  Perhaps these 
lawmakers feel that the benefits they can bring their districts through their appointments 
from the Republican Party will outweigh the potential costs or electoral punishment 
brought by of voting out-of-step with their district on the controversial stem cell research 
issue.   
Bill Thomas, the lone member of Congress who voted “yes” for H.R. 810 after his 
district voted “no” on Proposition 71, is an interesting case.  Thomas ran unopposed in 
his district, and won with one hundred percent of the vote.  It is possible that on the stem 
cell research issue, Thomas believes that allowing funding for embryonic stem cell 
research is good public policy, and chooses to promote that despite district opinion.  He 
seems to be acting more as a trustee by making the decision he feels is best for the district 
or nation, though his vote was not a direct reflection of the wishes of his constituency. 
Finally, the eight representatives who aligned their votes with their districts must 
be examined.  They share similarities with the legislators who appear to be unaffected by 
Proposition 71.  First, they are all Republican incumbents who, with the exception of 
David Dreier and Duke Cunningham, are in “safe” districts.  Second, several hold high-
ranking positions in the Republican Party in the House.  Why, then, did these 
representatives choose to vote differently?  The answer is quite complicated. 
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One important change to note is the change in the pro-life/pro-choice voting 
record of these representatives.  Prior to 2005, most of them were fairly staunchly pro-
life—Dana Rohrabacher has been especially well known for his commitment to pro-life 
causes in Congress.51  Stem cell research, especially embryonic stem cell research, has 
been connected to the abortion debate for quite some time.  Many conservatives argue 
that a fertilized embryo should be considered human life, and that the destruction of even 
a five day old fertilized cell is unethical and immoral.  Members’ of Congress deviation 
from that point of view can be seen in the following chart of interest group ratings from 
NARAL Pro-Choice and the National Right to Life Committee, a pro-life organization. 
Pro-life/Pro-choice Ratings for Select California Representatives 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
McKeon, Buck               
NARAL n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 83
Dreier, David              
NARAL n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 86
Jerry Lewis               
NARAL n/a 0 15 n/a 10 0 0
NRTL 88 88 100 100 91 91 86
Ken Calvert               
NARAL n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 86
Mary Bono               
NARAL n/a 22 55 n/a 20 100 45
NRTL 75 75 50 50 55 55 60
Rohrabacher, Dana               
NARAL n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 83
Issa, Darrel               
NARAL n/a 0 0 n/a 0 0 0
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 83
Cunningham, Duke        
                                                 
51 Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Limits on Stem Cell Research Re-emerge as a Political Issue.” The New York 
Times. 6 May 2004. 
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NARAL 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 0 
NRTL 100 100 100 100 100 100 n/a 
Source: Project Vote Smart/National Right to Life Committee 
 
 Four of the representatives expressed support for stem cell research prior to the 
vote on H.R. 810.  Mary Bono, a moderate Republican, helped bill sponsor Diana 
DeGette (D-CO) secure “yes” votes from her colleagues in the hallways prior to the vote, 
and was a co-sponsor of the bill.52  Duke Cunningham began to support embryonic stem 
cell research in 2003 after a San Diego scientist convinced him that many embryos left 
over from in-vitro fertilization are discarded as medical waste.  Cunningham even vowed 
to attempt to change President Bush’s mind on the stem cell issue, hoping that he would 
see the potential of the research to save or improve lives.53  Dana Rohrabacher, a strongly 
pro-life member of the California delegation who opposed the research in the past, was 
convinced to support embryonic stem cell research when he and his wife used in-vitro 
fertilization to give birth to triplets and learned that many embryos are thrown out.  
Furthermore, he was persuaded by Nancy Reagan following the death of President 
Reagan that stem cell research could help scientists find a cure for Alzheimer’s. 
Rohrabacher went so far as to sign a letter to President Bush in April 2004, urging him to 
alter his stance on embryonic stem cell research.54  Ken Calvert, also a long-time 
supporter of pro-life causes, signed the letter to President Bush as well.   
                                                 
52 Mulkern, Anne C. “DeGette Wins Stem Cell Fight via Guts.” The Denver Post. 29 May 2005. A-1. 
53 Neikirk, William. “Bush Faces GOP Shift on Stem Cells.” The Chicago Tribune. 31 May 2005.  
54 Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. “Limits on Stem Cell Research Re-emerge as a Political Issue.” The New York 
Times. 6 May 2004. 
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Bono’s, Cunningham’s and Rohrabacher’s districts all supported Proposition 71 
by fairly large margins of 11.6, 9.6 and 15.4 percentage points.  Calvert’s district was 
more moderate on Proposition 71, and the measure passed by only 5.6 points.  It seems 
most likely that these representatives were motivated by their own personal beliefs about 
embryonic stem cell research.  District support for the issue surely further cemented the 
representative’s decision, but each would probably have voted “yes” on H.R. 810 even if 
their district did not support Proposition 71. 
 David Dreier, another strongly pro-life representative, admitted that he did not 
make up his mind about the stem cell research bill until several days before the vote.  
Dreier is a high-ranking Republican—he serves as Chairman of the House Rules 
Committee.  However, party pressure did not sway Dreier’s vote, and he claims that 
Nancy Reagan influenced his decision.55  It is interesting to note also that Dreier’s district 
approved Proposition 71 by twelve percentage points, a substantial margin.  Furthermore, 
Dreier won the closest election in California in 2004, gaining only 53.6% of the vote.  
These factors may have been important in the calculation of Dreier’s decision—by 
aligning with his district, he may be attempting to avoid a rough campaign for re-election 
and another close race in 2006. 
Jerry Lewis’s case is also interesting.  Lewis won his 2004 bid for re-election with 
83% of the vote in his district; however, his constituents barely approved Proposition 71.  
Lewis, in the mean time, has remained quiet with his views on the stem cell research 
                                                 
55 Allen, Mike and Rick Weiss. “Bush Rejects Stem Cell Compromise.” The Washington Post. 26 May 
2005. A-2. 
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topic, though he voted “yes” for H.R. 810.  In a district that is seemingly very divided on 
a controversial issue, though very supportive of its representative, it remains possible that 
the representative would simply have to make his best judgment about how to vote based 
on personal beliefs.  Either way he chooses to vote, he will potentially anger half of the 
district.  In such a case, the representative must hope that his popularity will overcome 
any potential electoral repercussions. 
 The final two representatives, Buck McKeon and Darrel Issa, have not issued 
statements on stem cell research, and have not been mentioned in the news concerning 
stem cell research such as other representatives from California.  Both have strong pro-
life voting records in Congress, and both hold important committee positions.  In these 
cases, it seems that the representatives’ district’s approvals of Proposition 71 may have 
played a role.  However, there is a possibility that they were swayed by a number of other 
factors, including Nancy Reagan, who lobbied many California Republicans to support 
embryonic stem cell research. 
The bottom line is that many factors influence the decisions of members of 
Congress, especially involving wedge issues.  Party leadership can pressure 
representatives and deny them access to increased power if they do not choose policy 
positions that match the party’s platform.  Wedge issues are some of the most important 
and highly visible debates during campaigns, and electoral pressures from the district and 
the threat of losing one’s job play a role.  Motivation to make the best public policy to 
better the lives of people at the district, state, national or global level also weigh in.   
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It seems that my hypothesis is only correct in certain situations.  I believe that the 
district will have the most influence on the roll call vote of a representative in cases such 
as David Dreier’s, in which the member of Congress feels that his district is not “safe,” 
and where there is a great deal of support for the issue.  Otherwise, it seems that other 
factors are playing a more important role, especially the goal of creating public policy.  
Since wedge issues are often tied to one’s values, it seems logical that many 
representatives would feel strongly enough about the issue to vote their own conscious, 
with or without district approval.  However, it is important to note that only six of 53 
representatives from California voted out-of-line with their district preference.   
In closing, it must be reiterated that representation is an extremely complex 
process, and that lawmakers feel a great deal of pressure from many sides when they 
make decisions.  Perhaps later studies could probe the saliency of issues in districts to see 
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